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Abstract 
The determinants of media coverage of political scandals are examined through a 
content analysis of AP Wire stories in ten states from 1998 to 2005. Tests of the 
conventional explanations of the amount of media coverage demonstrate that political 
culture, institutional factors, and the prominence of the officials involved matter, but find 
only mixed evidence that scandal severity is an important factor. Contrary to 
assumptions, sexual scandals do not generate more media coverage than other types 
of exposés. 
 
Political scandals are often covered prominently in the press, alerting the public to 
transgressions by public officials. The Tennessee Waltz federal sting operation 
generated notable media attention because it involved members of the Tennessee 
General Assembly and the charges were serious. All 12 individuals charged in the case 
were ultimately found guilty in what has been called a historic case of public corruption 
(Erskine 2008). Some scandals generate a “feeding frenzy” (Sabato 1991) among the 
press, as when South Carolina’s governor, Mark Sanford, disappeared in June 2009 
and a media circus ensued about his location and who was in charge of the state. The 
governor admitted that he had been in Argentina and had been having an extramarital 
affair (Cillizza 2009). In comparison to the Tennessee Waltz scandal, which led to 
convictions for bribery and prison sentences, the Sanford incident generated coverage 
because of the importance of the official involved and its sexual nature. 
 
Media coverage of scandals often results in legislative reforms, and scholars 
have studied the responses of different states to ethics violations and illegal activities 
(see Rosenson 2003, 2005; Rosenthal 1996). In the aftermath of scandals, Kentucky 
and South Carolina adopted much more restrictive lobbying regulations (Grimm 2003; 
Newmark 2005, 2008), but the driving force behind such reforms is often the media 
coverage that draws attention to the events. Since coverage has been shown to have 
important policy implications through agenda setting (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; 
McCombs and Shaw 1972), priming (Miller and Krosnick 2000), and framing of public 
problems (Iyengar 1991; Nelson and Oaxley 1999), it is important to determine whether 
the attention given any scandal is proportionate to its nature or magnitude. This poses 
the question of whether the volume of media coverage of any scandal involving political 
officials is a function primarily of the political culture in the state, the severity of the 
transgression, the nature of the incident (e.g., sexual vs. financial), the office of the 
individual(s) involved, or institutional factors. Knowing the answer will contribute to a 
better understanding of whether media coverage is driven by substantive criteria 
(Freudenburg, Coleman, Gonzales, and Helgeland 1996; Gans 1980) or by a desire to 
sensationalize events (Hamilton 2004; Patterson 2000; Reinemann, Carsten, Scherr, 
and Legnante 2011). 
 
Media Coverage 
Media attention to an issue is an indication that it is important (Iyengar and Kinder 1987; 
Miller and Krosnick 2000). Not surprisingly, a substantial literature has developed on the 
agenda-setting role of the mass media (Cook 1998; Gans 1980; Hamilton 2004; Iyengar 
and Kinder 1987; McComb and Shaw 1972). Gans (1980) discusses the ways in which 
the media decide what is newsworthy and the means by which journalists select stories. 
The media shape public opinion and influence what makes it onto the agenda based on 
what journalists write, broadcasters report, or editors allow (Hamilton 2004; McCombs 
and Shaw 1972). 
Tumber and Waisbord (2004) have observed the investigative role of the media, 
and others have noted how this can translate into government reforms (Kindgon 1984; 
Rosenson 2005). Coverage of scandals can affect policy by influencing lawmakers 
directly or from the indirect pressure that a change in public opinion exerts on decision-
makers (see Baumgartner and Jones 1993; Birkland 1998; Cobb, Ross, and Ross 
1976). 
Several state legislatures, for example, have approved stringent ethics legislation 
during or soon after major scandals. After lawmakers in South Carolina were caught on 
camera selling their votes, the state adopted much more rigorous legislation governing 
the behavior of public officials (Grimm 2003; Newmark 2005, 2008). 
In 2006, while investigation was still under way and trials were pending in the 
Tennessee Waltz sting operation, the state’s General Assembly adopted legislation to 
create an ethics commission and further restrict lobbying activity (Emery 2006). Without 
the heightened attention, it is unlikely these reforms would have been implemented. 
A number of factors influence the content and quantity of coverage. McCarthy, McPhail, 
and Smith (1996) note that media attention increases with protest demonstration size 
and serves as an indicator of an issue’s importance. Freudenburg and colleagues’ 
(1996) study of “hazard events” (threats to people from disasters, accidents, 
catastrophes) reveals that coverage is related to objective measures such as the 
number of casualties resulting from the occurrence. Gans (1980) notes the negative 
focus of coverage, where approximately 69 percent of news stories deal with protests, 
scandals, crime, investigations, disasters, and government conflicts. Freudenburg and 
colleagues (1996, 32) suggest in explanation that “media coverage is governed more by 
the need to excite than to inform” (see also Singer and Endreny 1993). Not surprisingly, 
Waisbord (1994, 21) argues, 
“Scandals are unthinkable 
without the intervention of the 
mass media” (see Tumber 
and Waisbord 2004, 1143). 
Put another way, negative 
events may happen,  but 
incidents must be publicized 
in order to become scandals 
(cf. Rosenson 2005). 
 
The media are 
motivated by profit and have 
a requisite need to sell 
papers and advertisements 
(Freudenburg et al. 1996; 
Hamilton 2004; Patterson 
2000). Even if readership 
levels or viewing audiences 
vary, the desire to make 
money is relatively consistent. 
Because readers and viewers find controversy provocative, the media simply supply 
what sells, and consequently the news, is increasingly tabloidized, focusing more and 
more on scandals and corruption (Reinemann et al. 2011; Tumber and Waisbord 2004). 
Accordingly, some scholars have called attention to the media’s sensationalism and 
proclivity to dramatize events— the “softening of the news” (Baum 2002; Freudenburg 
et al. 1996; Patterson 2000; Singer and Endreny 1993). Dramatic events receive a 
disproportionate amount of coverage relative to the ordinary, even in cases in which 
commonplace occurrences are more significant in the long run. 
 
Why do some scandals generate substantial coverage, but others do not? We offer five 
explanations for coverage of political scandals, dealing, respectively, with (a) political 
culture, (b) the nature of the scandal, (c) the prominence of the official(s) involved, (d) 
the severity of the scandal, and (e) reform-based, state institutional factors that might 
influence coverage indirectly. 
 
Cultural Influences on Behavior and Media Coverage 
Communities have a cultural identity, and this is an important factor to consider when 
studying public policy change or identifying what is considered normal behavior (Ostrom 
1999; Stone 2002). Individuals who share a set of values and norms of behavior are 
more likely to develop and abide by a set of rules adequate to govern the common 
resources of the group (Ostrom 1999); the rules will therefore reflect the dominant 
culture of the community. For example, political culture explains the extent of lobbying 
regulations (Opheim 1991) and the authorization of ethics commissions and state ethics 
laws (Rosenson 2005). Thus, some states may be more likely to punish violators, while 
others may allow certain transgressions because it is the norm or part of the culture. 
 
Culture affects not only how states respond to scandals but also how the media 
cover them. While the U.S. press typically swarms over scandals involving public 
officials and sex, similar attention to such matters is not the norm in every country. In 
France, for instance, where having a wife and a mistress is accepted to a greater extent 
than in the United States, a photo of former French president François Mitterrand’s wife 
and mistress standing near one another at his funeral was not considered particularly 
scandalous. A similar scene at a U.S. funeral, however, would incite a firestorm of press 
response due to the country’s different norms. 
 
Elazar (1972) postulated that some political subcultures are more accepting of 
scandals than others. Individualistic cultures generally call for government action only 
as a means to facilitate a market-driven economy or when a specific public need elicits 
it; people in individualistic cultures may have little interest in what happens in the 
political world if it is not related to their own economic situation. This may explain 
Rosenson’s (2005) finding that individualistic cultures are less likely to adopt stringent 
ethics laws and thus may be more tolerant of backroom politics. 
 
Moralistic cultures, however, are typically characterized by a sense of civic duty; 
the norm in these cultures is to expect officials to behave ethically. In their study of the 
implementation of state ethics policies, Vaughan and Newmark (2008) noted that 
certain states are unusually evasive in discussing matters related to enforcement. They 
suggest that North Dakota, which did not have an ethics commission or a formal 
process for reporting allegations of misconduct at the time, may be more evasive 
because it has less experience dealing with questionable behaviors than other states. 
Thus, when a scandal breaks in a state where officials are expected to abide by ethical 
norms, the media are likely to pay greater attention. Moralistic states are expected to 
view scandals with more outrage, making it more likely that the media will respond with 
greater coverage. In these cultures, the sense of civic duty among public and media 
alike causes them to be critical of officials who abuse their positions, at least in 
comparison to individualistic and traditional cultures. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Coverage of scandals will be greater in states with moralistic 
cultures than in those with individualistic cultures. 
 
Traditional cultures present a more complicated situation, and how the media 
might respond to scandals in these states is less clear. Traditional cultures typically 
favor the status quo (Elazar 1972), and historically their elites sometimes engaged in 
behaviors that would be ethically questionable today. In recent years, however, many of 
these states have shown less tolerance for misconduct. This presents two possibilities. 
On the one hand, if traditional cultures are still somewhat accepting of political 
misdeeds, one would expect no difference in or even less coverage of transgressions 
by the media. On the other hand, it is also possible that a traditional culture might see 
even greater media coverage of scandals. This could be because there are a higher 
number of scandals in those states, or it might be because the status quo has changed 
such that political transgressions are now taken more seriously, and thus the media are 
responding to scandals they would not have considered newsworthy 50 years ago. 
Thus there are competing hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 2a: States with traditional cultures will have no greater coverage of 
scandals than states with individualistic cultures. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: States with traditional cultures will have greater coverage of 
scandals than states with individualist cultures. 
 
The Severity of Scandals 
All things equal, more severe scandals should garner greater media attention. This is 
consistent with the findings of Gans (1980) and others who have noted that crimes and 
trials generate substantial coverage. Thus, when the dispensation of the scandal 
involves criminal charges, one would expect greater attention. Similarly, resignations of 
public officials tend to generate a great deal of coverage. Again, when a scandal results 
in a resignation, it is an indication that it is important, at least relative to scandals in 
which officials retain their jobs. Thus: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Scandals with severe dispensation will generate greater coverage 
than those that are less severe. 
 
The Nature of Scandals 
When scandals involve taboo subjects like sexual misconduct, one would expect even 
greater coverage, given the old adage that sex sells. Gitlin (1996) noted the journalistic 
value of the sexual scandals involving Bill Clinton. According to Tumber and Waisbord 
(2004), the Monica Lewinsky scandal resulted in the notable growth of several news 
channels and significant revenue increases for a number of media outlets. At the 
extreme, the tabloids devote an enormous amount of space and time to scandals—
legitimate and otherwise—that are sexual in nature. Because people are interested in 
scandals that are sexually oriented, the media will respond to these events with 
increased coverage because of the financial incentives associated with increased 
readership. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Sexual scandals will generate greater media coverage than those 
of a general nature. 
 
Financial scandals like embezzlement of funds by public officials should also garner a 
great deal of attention. These usually involve illegal activity, are likely to erode trust in 
government, and therefore should be considered important by both the public and the 
media. The public is typically suspicious about how government spends money, so 
when officials misuse funds, media and citizenry are certain to pay attention. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 5: Financial scandals will generate greater coverage than those of a 
general nature. 
 
 
Prominence of Officials Involved 
Scandals involving prominent officials like a governor or members of the legislature will 
be covered more extensively in the press than matters involving less notable 
individuals. Most ordinary people cannot name very many state officials, but the 
governor is an exception, since 75 to 85 percent of the public can identify their state’s 
chief executive. Headlines involving a governor should garner greater attention than 
those involving a street-level bureaucrat or other officials, so the likely outcome is 
greater coverage of any questionable behavior by a prominent individual. Therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 6: Scandals involving prominent officials will generate greater 
coverage than those involving lesser-known officials. 
 
Furthermore, when scandals that involve well-known officials also include more serious 
charges or allegations of sexual impropriety, coverage will be even greater. For Mark 
Sanford and also for former New York governor Eliot Spitzer (who resigned following 
revelations of his patronage of prostitutes), the scandal involved both a prominent 
official and sex. Such a combination of factors leads to expectations that: 
 
Hypothesis 7: Severe scandals involving prominent officials generate greater 
coverage than those without such combinations; and 
 
Hypothesis 8: Sexual scandals involving prominent officials generate greater 
coverage than those without such combinations. 
 
Institutional Influences on Coverage 
Institutional factors are sometimes designed to influence behavior. As noted, some 
states have more rigorous laws and structures regulating the behavior of officials. 
States with ethics commissions or other institutional means to regulate compliance with 
ethical standards may be more likely to keep unethical behavior in check, either by 
deterring it or by punishing it in a timely manner. Even when an ethics commission has 
been created as a political response to past problems (the proverbial closing of the barn 
door once the horse is loose), its existence is still a signal that the state is serious about 
regulating the conduct of its officials (see Rosenson 2005). Regardless of the impetus 
for its creation, the presence of an ethics commission should lead to greater scrutiny of 
political behavior throughout the state and thereby have a mitigating effect on 
misbehavior. As a result, there will be less for the media to write about, either because 
there are fewer instances of unethical behavior or because misdeeds are uncovered 
before they escalate in severity. As discussed, some states are more strict than others 
in regulating the behavior of officials. Once more stringent regulations are in place and 
enforced, officials should have a greater incentive to “play by the rules,” leaving the 
media with fewer or less severe scandals to report. Thus, there are two institutional 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 9: States with ethics commissions will have less coverage of 
scandals than those without them. 
 
Hypothesis 10: States with more stringent regulations will have less coverage 
than those with less stringent regulations. 
 
Exploring the Impact of Scandal 
The five explanations of scandal coverage were tested with an examination of ten 
states—Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Mexico, North Dakota, 
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Tennessee. The states were selected 
according to a series of criteria. The Bureau of Economic Analysis categorization of 
regions was used in order to obtain geographic variation in the sample of states. 
There was also variation in the cultural and partisan leanings of the states. For example, 
four of the states in the sample were traditional, three individualistic, and three 
moralistic. The states also varied in the extent to which they regulate political behavior. 
South Carolina, which leads the country in lobbying (Newmark 2005) and ethics 
regulation (Rosenson 2005), has structural factors that give it greater ability to enforce 
its substantial legislation than North Dakota, which has fewer institutional restrictions on 
behavior. 
 
In order to assess the scope of media coverage in each of the ten states, stories 
were obtained from the Lexis-Nexis™ database of Associated Press State and Local 
Wire (APSL) articles from August 4, 1998, to December 31, 2005, to identify those 
involving conduct, ethics, or legal violations by government officials.1 The APSL was the 
most appropriate source for this research because it provides a consistent medium by 
which to examine multiple states across time. Because of the variability in number and 
types of newspapers in different regions of the country, searching individual 
newspapers rather than using the APSL would have resulted in data that were much 
more inconsistent across the states, since there are significant differences not only in 
the number of newspapers per state but also in readership, budgets, and geographic 
distribution. Additionally, use of the APSL rather than searching individual papers 
mitigated possible variations due to the location of the reporter or origin of the story, 
since the centralized news organization determines what goes out over the wire. Given 
that the APSL picks up state and local scandals in every state, includes material from 
regional sources, and serves as a source for other news outlets, it provided the most 
suitable coverage of scandals over the period studied in a way that best compensated 
for the differences between media markets. 
 
The data collection began by identifying and conducting initial searches with 
dozens of words and search strings related to scandals, ethics, legal issues, and 
conduct violations involving public officials. Numerous permutations of these search 
terms were then tested to construct a list of terms that would narrow the pool to the 
relevant articles dealing with scandals involving public officials. For example, the search 
term parameters included all variants of such words as “ethics” or “violate” or “scandal” 
and “govern” or “official” or “legislate” in the full text. The search also included words 
and phrases that included “judicial,” “conduct,” “code,” “scandal,” and so on. For just the 
ten states included in the sample, these parameters yielded a total of 3,198 articles. 
Each article was given an initial review to determine its relevance before it underwent 
full content analysis. Full content analysis was conducted on the 1,223 articles that met 
the inclusion criteria. Only articles involving officials from the ten sample states were 
included, with the exception of incidents in which the violation occurred in one of the ten 
states, but the official(s) involved in the violation was from a different state. Prominent 
stories are sometimes duplicated across the APSL Wire on subsequent days. This 
reflects greater public exposure of the content, because local papers that did not pick up 
the story initially may decide to print it on its subsequent release. These duplicate 
articles were included in the count because they indicated increased strength of 
coverage.2 
 
The coding scheme was developed to determine the nature of the scandal, the 
government officials involved, and the most recent status of the event or its 
dispensation (i.e., whether the official resigned or was removed, and faced criminal 
charges or other disciplinary proceedings).3 Because legislative action has been shown 
to follow scandals with particularly extensive media coverage, the coding scheme was 
designed to also include information regarding pending legislation when available. 
 
The search produced 1,223 articles within the target time period. Aggregating 
these by scandal (the unit of analysis) resulted in a total of 519 discreet scandals in the 
ten states. For each identified scandal, the total articles per case and the duration of 
coverage (number of days between the first and last articles) were determined. Duration 
is important because scandals that take place over an extended period should generate 
greater coverage than those that are relatively short lived. The data were then recoded 
from the content analysis into measures that reflected the total media reported 
information for each event (based on all the articles for each scandal). 
 
Four dependent variables served as indicators of the magnitude of media 
coverage of scandals. Quantity of coverage, typically assessed in column inches or a 
similar measure, is frequently used in studies of the media to gauge issue importance 
(see Freudenburg et al. 1996; Hamilton 2004; Mazur and Lee 1993; Smith 1997). A 
greater amount of coverage is an indication of what the media think is significant, and 
every article printed increases the exposure of the public to a scandal. The first 
dependent variable measured the total number of articles devoted to a given scandal 
and ranged from 1 to 51, with a mean of 2.34 and standard deviation of 4.235 (see 
Appendix Table A1).4 It follows that the more words there are in an article, the greater 
detail it provides about a scandal, which also increases the scandal’s exposure. 
Therefore, the second dependent variable measured the total word count of media 
coverage for a given scandal. The number of words devoted to a given scandal ranged 
from 64 to 30,558, with a mean of 1,308.6 and standard deviation of 2,798.08. 
 
Although the Associated Press State and Local Wire was used in order to 
mitigate the effects of differential numbers and sizes of newspapers in the states, the 
third dependent variable was designed to also take into account the variation in 
population across states. Since more populous states may have greater coverage by 
virtue of having more newspapers or larger readerships, the third dependent variable 
measured the number of per capita words per scandal in a given state.5 This 
standardized measure ranged from 0.013 to 7.473, with a mean of 0.310 and standard 
deviation of 0.751. Given this distribution, the natural log was used, which ranged from 
–4.33 to 2.01, with a mean of –1.01 and standard deviation of 1.1. The final dependent 
variable was the number of words per article, which was designed to measure the depth 
of coverage. The words per article ranged from 64 to 2,590, with a mean of 500.75 and 
standard deviation of 309.17; the variable was also logged (ranging from 4.16 to 7.86; M 
= 6.06, SD = 0.57). 
 
The independent variables were designed to determine what characteristics of 
the state or individuals involved would drive greater media attention (see Appendix 
Table A1). Culture was measured using Gray’s (2004) update of Elazar (1972). 
Two dummy variables were used for states with moralistic and traditional cultures, and 
individualistic cultures served as a baseline category because these states were 
theoretically more likely to accept or be indifferent to scandal. A series of dummy 
variables was designed to capture the nature and severity of the scandal, as well as the 
level of prestige of the individual(s) involved. The content analysis of these articles 
helped determine whether a state legislator was involved, whether the governor’s office 
was involved, and whether the scandal was sexual, financial, or general in nature. 
There were two dummy variables for the nature of the exposé, one for sexual scandals 
and one for those that were financial. A third, baseline variable included all other 
scandals that were more general in nature. Consideration was also given to whether or 
not criminal charges were filed and whether anyone resigned because of the scandal. 
Each of these variables was coded 1 if the activity took place (or involved that official) 
and 0 if it did not. 
 
Since sexual scandals or resignations involving the governor’s office or 
lawmakers should logically generate greater media coverage, three interaction terms 
were included. The first of these, a variable for sexual scandals involving the governor 
or the office of the governor, was constructed by multiplying the gubernatorial variable 
by the sexual variable. The second, for resignations involving the governor or the office, 
was created by multiplying the gubernatorial variable by the resignation variable. The 
third interaction term was designed to capture the effect of legislative resignations on 
media coverage, and it was calculated by multiplying whether a legislator was involved 
and whether there was a resignation.6 Thus, lawmaker involvement along with a 
resignation should generate increased media coverage. 
 
Newmark’s (2005) data on lobbying regulation were used to determine how 
strictly the state regulated the behavior of government officials. Although not a perfect 
measure, because the data focus on regulation of lobbyists as well as lawmakers, they 
were the only replicable metric available that examined state efforts over the time in 
which the study took place. The fact that individual years correlated highly with 
Rosenson’s measures of ethics regulation further enhanced the utility of Newmark’s 
data in this instance. The measure of lobbying regulation used corresponded to the year 
in which a scandal took place in a given state. A dummy variable for whether or not the 
state had a centralized ethics commission during the period under study was also 
included. 
 
Measures for population and for the duration of the scandal (time) were used as 
controls. Population data were obtained from census.gov for the year corresponding to 
each scandal in the state in which it took place. Scandals that took place over a long 
period should generate greater coverage than those that were short-lived. For example, 
a scandal that lasts a single day is likely to have far less coverage than one that lasts 
weeks or months. Therefore, time is an indicator of the number of days elapsing from 
the first article for a given scandal until the last article and is a necessary control given 
that duration should influence the quantity of coverage.7 Although these data took place 
over time, temporal ordering was not relevant because each unit was a discrete scandal 
and there was no trend in the data.8 Multivariate models were estimated with negative 
binomial regression and ordinary least squares, depending on the nature and 
distribution of the dependent variables. 
 
Findings and Analysis 
The number of scandals, as well as the amount of coverage they generated, varied 
notably across the ten states. There were 100 such events in South Carolina over the 
time period; Pennsylvania and Kentucky followed with 86 and 76 scandals, respectively. 
At the other end of the spectrum were Minnesota (38), Tennessee (37), and North 
Dakota (10). The variation in the attention the scandals generated was even more 
dramatic. Figure 1a shows the number of APSL Wire stories devoted to scandals over 
the time period; the number of articles ranged from 260 in Kentucky to only 13 in North 
Dakota. Figure 1b offers a preliminary examination of the quantity of coverage based on 
the number of scandals. Kentucky, Tennessee, and 
 
Minnesota averaged three or more articles for each exposés that took place in these 
states. South Carolina and North Dakota, however, had just over a single article 
devoted to each scandal on average. 
 
A preliminary look suggests that the quantity of coverage corresponds to the level of 
seriousness of the transgressions or the public officials involved. The seriousness of the 
Tennessee Waltz exposé was noted above, and the data confirm that it garnered its fair 
share of attention. However, while three scandals in Tennessee generated 29, 18, and 
15 articles, respectively, the modal number of articles was still one. As expected, the 
single-article scandals were typically minor, while the ones that generated greater 
coverage tended to be more serious, involving, for instance, bribery or prominent 
officials like state lawmakers. North Dakota’s problems were less serious—such as a 
city council violating the state’s open-meeting law—and garnered less attention. Many 
of South Carolina’s scandals involved local public officials who failed to disclose 
financial campaign information; these generated little media coverage. 
 
In order to identify the 
determinants of the amount of 
media coverage, the first and 
second multivariate models were 
designed to examine the factors 
that influenced the number of 
articles devoted to any given 
scandal (Table 1). While the number of articles per scandal ranged from a single article 
to fifty-one, 62 percent had only one. Therefore, the first two models were estimated 
with negative binomial regression because the dependent variable was an 
overdispersed count variable (Cameron and Trivedi 1998; Long and Freese 2006). 
 
The first model regressed the total number of articles per scandal on the 
independent variables, identified above, relating to culture, the officials involved, the 
nature of the event, its dispensation, and institutional factors (see Table 1). Since 
negative binomial coefficients indicate the difference in the log of the estimated number 
of articles, a more useful interpretation is to consider the incidence rate ratios (see 
Long and Freese 2006; for rate ratios, see Appendix Table A2). 
 
The estimated rate ratio compares, for example, instances that involved a 
governor (or office) to those in which the executive was not primarily involved. Holding 
all variables constant, if a governor is part of the scandal, we can expect to have a rate 
of 1.26 times more articles than if a executive is not primarily involved (p < 0.06). 
Scandals involving the legislature did not matter. 
 
The data suggested that institutional factors may be important, as the ethics 
commission variable had an estimated negative effect on the number of articles devoted 
to a given scandal. The rate ratio suggested that the presence of an ethics commission 
would decrease the rate of coverage by a factor of 0.30. States with stricter regulation of 
public officials had marginally fewer articles than those with less regulation (p < 0.10). 
 
The dispensation of cases appeared to affect the number of articles. Relevant 
events involving resignations can be expected to generate a rate of 24 percent more 
articles than those without this outcome (p < 0.05), and criminal charges may have an 
effect of a comparable magnitude (p < 0.06) of about 25 percent more. 
 
The interaction of gubernatorial office involvement with sexual scandals was also 
positive and marginally significant (p < 0.10). The strongest influence, however, was 
found with articles dealing with resignations of officials associated with the governor. 
The coefficient indicated that this variable was expected to have a rate ratio of 6.6 times 
greater coverage than scandals involving the governor’s office without resignations, 
holding all the other variables constant. The legislator*resignation interaction term was 
also significant in the expected positive direction, and the rate ratio of 2.2 indicated an 
expectation of more than twice the rate of coverage under these circumstances. 
 
Political culture does not appear to matter in this model, as neither of the 
variables for moralistic or traditional culture was statistically significant. There were no 
significant effects with events that were financial or sexual in nature. Controls for state 
 
 
population and time were both positive and significant (p < 0.001), as expected. 
 
Another way of looking at the amount of coverage is to examine the number of words 
devoted to a scandal (second model, Table 1). In this case, the dependent variable is 
the number of words devoted to each event, and the model is also estimated using 
negative binomial regression given the overdispersed nature of the variable. The 
variables for both moralistic and traditional culture were positive and statistically 
significant (p < 0.01), indicating that scandals in states characterized as having these 
cultures were expected to generate 
substantially more words than those in areas 
with individualistic cultures, the baseline. This 
suggests an expected increased rate of 
1.87 times more coverage in moralistic 
cultures, and 1.65 times more coverage in 
traditional cultures, as compared with 
individualistic ones. 
 
Both of the measures of prominent officials involved—legislators and governors 
(or their offices)—were estimated to positively influence the number of words devoted to 
a scandal. Incidents involving lawmakers were estimated to have a rate of 41 percent 
more words than those not involving them (p < 0.001), and those involving the 
governor’s office were expected to have a rate of 65 percent greater than those in which 
the governor’s office was not implicated (p < 0.001). As expected, cases that resulted in 
resignations were estimated to increase the number of words devoted to a scandal by a 
factor of 1.27 compared to cases without this dispensation. 
 
For states with greater regulation, there was an expected decrease in the rate 
ratio by 0.08, and the presence of an ethics commission was also expected to exhibit a 
negative influence on media coverage (p < 0.10). Two of the three interaction terms 
were highly significant in the expected positive direction, and the magnitudes of the 
coefficients were quite substantial. The legislator*resignation term indicated more than 
twice the expected words, and the governor*resignation term suggested 9.76 times the 
words of the reference categories.9 Interestingly, interacting the gubernatorial variable 
with sexual scandals did not increase media coverage. Again, the nature of the scandal 
was not important, as neither financial nor sexual events were estimated to have an 
influence on the number of words. 
 
The natural concern is that larger states have greater news coverage because 
they have more media outlets than smaller states. This is precisely why APSL Wire 
stories were used rather than total number of newspaper articles, which would more 
likely be influenced by larger numbers of newspapers in more populous states. 
Certainly, the population variables were significant in all models presented thus far. 
While it is possible that larger states might also have a greater number of scandals and 
therefore more media coverage, this is not always the case. For example, Indiana’s 
population is more than 6 million and Oregon’s is a little more than 3.5 million people. 
Between 1998 and 2005, Oregon had 3.51 words per scandal for each 1,000 residents, 
compared to only 1.78 in Indiana. Nonetheless, the models were also estimated using 
per capita word count as the dependent variable with population removed as an 
independent variable. 
 
The first model presented in Table 2 has both notable similarities and differences 
to the earlier models. The model regresses a logged, standardized measure of words 
per scandal per 1,000 population on the same independent variables as in 
 
 
 
the previous two models (excluding population) using ordinary least squares. States 
with moralistic and traditional cultures were estimated to have a greater number of 
words per scandal relative to population than 
individualistic cultures (p < 0.001). 
Scandals involving the governor’s office 
increased expected coverage (p < 0.001), as 
did those involving lawmakers. Gubernatorial as 
well as legislative involvement was estimated to 
increase coverage of scandals. As with 
previous models, stricter regulation of political behavior was estimated to decrease the 
relative number of words per scandal (p < 0.001). If scandals drive media attention, the 
existence of institutions and legal infrastructure to regulate behavior appear to inhibit 
these events and therefore the media coverage. 
 
While none of the individual variables for the nature of the scandal or the 
dispensation of the case were significant in the models, two of the three interaction 
terms were again significant in the expected positive direction. Scandals involving the 
governor’s office when resignations took place can expect substantial increases in the 
standardized word coverage (p < 0.001) in comparison to the reference category. 
Legislative scandals involving resignation can also expect an increase in standardized 
coverage compared with those not involving this outcome. 
 
The final model in Table 2 assessed the influence of the explanatory variables on 
the number of words per article, which is an indication of the depth of coverage. Again, 
the dependent variable was logged. States with moralistic and traditional cultures were 
expected to have a greater number of words per article relative to individualistic 
cultures. Episodes involving prominent officials were also expected to have a greater 
number of words per article than scandals not involving these officials. Legislative and 
gubernatorial involvement was expected to increase the number of words per article as 
well. States with stricter regulation of officials were expected to have fewer words per 
article than those with lesser restrictions. As with the previous models, the nature of the 
incident had no effect on the number of words per article, nor did case dispensation. 
Finally, none of the interaction terms were statistically significant. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This study began with a rather simple question: What explains the amount of media 
coverage of political scandals? With the exception of the number of articles, political 
culture is a consistent determinant of the amount of media coverage, as moralistic and 
traditional states tend to have more coverage of scandals than individualistic states. The 
results offer moderately strong support for H1 and H2b. Moralistic states are more 
sensitive to the behavior of public officials, and the media respond accordingly. But if 
the media’s watchdog role has changed, it may have done so the most in traditional 
cultures, such that acceptance of inappropriate behaviors is no longer the norm; thus 
the media now respond to scandals more vigilantly, resulting in greater coverage. 
 
Despite the large number of scandals and articles included in the dataset, there are 
some limitations to the conclusions that can be derived from examining the effects of 
political culture on media coverage of scandals in ten states. While it is possible to 
conclude that traditional states like Kentucky and Tennessee have more coverage than 
an individualistic state like Indiana, a larger sample would be required to extend this 
conclusion definitively to all 50 states. It might be interesting for future analysis to 
incorporate the effect of partisanship as well as 
culture on media coverage. Puglisi and 
Snyder (2011a, 2011b) suggest that newspaper 
coverage of scandals tends to align with the 
preferences of the median voter within its 
readership, the partisanship of the officials 
involved in the incident, and the partisan leanings 
of the newspapers reporting the events. Aggregating the APSL Wire stories mitigated 
the effects of partisanship between individual newspapers, but the effects of party 
warrant further study. Still, these results enhance our understanding of the role of 
culture in shaping how the media respond to allegations of misconduct by officials. 
 
The results are quite intuitive when it comes to the notoriety of the people 
involved. Exposés implicating prominent officials like governors and lawmakers are 
likely to receive more attention than scandals involving lesser-known public employees, 
like state agency personnel or college professors (supporting H6). In an analysis not 
shown, several scandals involving professors at state universities were examined, and 
they seldom generated much coverage. Even events involving judges or agency heads 
received less news coverage than those concerning members of the governor’s staff 
and state legislators. Governors and state lawmakers tend to be the better-known state 
officials, and when they are involved in a scandal, the media are much more prone to 
report their transgressions, adding to their notoriety. Incidents involving less-known 
officials are likely to sell fewer papers, so reporters devote less space to them. It is also 
likely that less-known officials, especially those at the local level, are reported on only in 
local papers. 
 
The severity of the scandal mattered only under certain circumstances, and there was 
only some support for H3. Scandals involving criminal charges were marginally 
significant in only a single model, while resignations increased coverage in two of the 
four models. However, more consistent results were observed by examining 
resignations of prominent officials (H7). Kentucky offers an example of substantial 
coverage involving the governor, and the degree of attention is larger because of the 
severity of the incident and how it was dispensed. Governor Ernie Fletcher’s 
administration was involved in a personnel scandal in 2005 that included indictments of 
several officials, criminal charges, resignations, firings, and ultimately a pardon for all 
parties involved (except the governor) (see Chellgren 2005). This suggests that the 
more serious events are covered proportionately to the prominence of the officials 
involved, and this is compounded when the scandal results in resignations. These 
findings comport with observations by scholars who have examined how coverage 
corresponds to dramatic, negative, catastrophic, or hazard events (see Gans 1980; 
Goidel and Langley 1995; Mazur and Lee 1993; Tumber and Waisbord 2004). When 
accusations are more serious and involve prominent officials, the media and the public 
take notice, putting pressure on lawmakers to adopt reforms. For those concerned with 
good government reform, more severe scandals do result in changes in ethics laws 
based on evidence from South Carolina, Kentucky, and Tennessee; 
this is consistent with Rosenson’s (2005) work. 
 
Institutional reforms also appear to play a role in the coverage of scandals. There 
was moderate support for H9 that the presence of an ethics commission led to less 
coverage in terms of number of articles and number of words. For the time period of this 
study, Minnesota, North Dakota, New Mexico, and Tennessee did not have ethics 
commissions in place, while South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Massachusetts, 
Kentucky, and Indiana did. Interestingly, the states without commissions had fewer 
scandals than those with them. While it may be difficult to draw conclusions from this 
observation with only ten states, it is notable that those with no commission averaged 
31.5 scandals, while those with a commission had 66 scandals, on average. It may be, 
at least in part, that states with commissions have them because there are more ethical 
problems involving state officials. However, once a scandal has taken place, states with 
commissions appear to have less media coverage, at least according to some of the 
models. The causal relationship among scandals, the likelihood of having a 
commission, and subsequent media coverage are all worthy of additional attention. 
 
The findings also suggest that states with stricter lobbying regulations have less 
coverage of scandals, offering moderately strong support for H10. Since states have 
responded to scandals by increasing their ethics regulations (Rosenson 2005) and 
lobbying restrictions (Newmark 2005), it is quite possible that because these events 
often result in stricter laws, they also contribute to a decrease in unethical behaviors, 
which therefore decreases the need for media coverage. The next step is to examine 
more closely the behavior of political actors, the laws and institutions that govern them, 
and the media coverage to better understand how they interact with each other. 
 
Surprisingly, there was no evidence that the nature of the event had any impact 
on the amount of media coverage (H4 and H5). Neither financial nor sexual scandals 
generated greater coverage than other scandals (regardless of how this is measured). 
Financial scandals were also no more likely to have serious repercussions for the 
perpetrators than other incidents, as there was virtually no relationship between those 
that were financial in nature and criminal charges. Even the relationship between 
financial scandals and convictions (not reported) was limited. 
 
Finally, and this was the most surprising finding, sexual scandals did not generate 
greater news coverage than those that were not carnal in nature. Even when a sexual 
scandal involved the governor’s office, the media coverage was not increased (with the 
marginal exception of the number of articles). This does not mean that some exposé 
involving the governor (or the office) and sex will not garner media attention, as many of 
these exposés are covered prominently in the press. Rather, and contrary to what is 
widely assumed, the data, in the aggregate, do not suggest that this combination of 
factors leads to systematically greater media coverage. This finding leaves unexplored 
the factors that keep some events in the news for long periods of time, while others die 
out quickly. Sexual transgressions, for example, might receive a great deal of attention 
for a short time and then end rather quickly. Certainly, what keeps an exposé in the 
news warrants additional exploration. Still, there is a note of optimism in the finding that 
sex does not increase media attention, for it suggests that coverage is driven by factors 
other than image. Even if the media are motivated by what sells (Hamilton 2004; 
Patterson 2000), the data indicate that this motivation does not crowd out responsible 
reporting with regard to scandals. 
 
Notes 
1. The start date of August 4, 1998, was chosen because it was the earliest date 
for which articles were available for all ten states. 
2. Articles categorized as duplicates had the same title, the same word count (±5 
words), and were printed within two consecutive days of the original article. Duplication 
is included in the analysis because it is an indication of what the media think is 
important. When the models were estimated without the duplicates, the results were 
little different from what is reported here. 
3. The full content analysis involved coding the scandals for each article to 
identity the primary and secondary officials involved, the government entity involved, the 
nature of the violation, the number of alleged violations, the dispensation of the case, 
the individual or entity who initiated the case, the individuals or entity involved in any 
investigation, whether there were resignations, whether legislation resulted from the 
scandal, and if so the nature of the legislation. Some of these were not determinable for 
some of the scandals; some were highly collinear with other variables and were 
excluded from the analysis. 
4. The likelihood that larger states would have greater news coverage is why the 
APSL Wire stories were used rather than specific newspapers. Population and time 
were included as controls. A standardized version of this variable relative to population 
was estimated, and the results were similar to the models presented below. The third 
dependent variable also addresses this issue. 
5. It is also possible that more populous states would have more issues, and if so 
this would result in less attention to any individual case. These relationships are 
addressed in the analysis section. 
6. A fourth term was created to capture legislative sexual scandals, but it was 
dropped from the models due to multicollinearity. 
7. Time for a scandal with a single article was coded 1. Both the duration of a 
scandal and the possibility that a given time period might have either a greater number 
of scandals or heightened coverage of them were also considered. In addition to 
including a variable measuring the duration of scandals, all of the models were 
estimated with fixed effects for time (not shown). This was designed to capture any 
idiosyncratic factors that might explain heightened coverage in a given year. Since the 
results were similar to those reported, the more parsimonious models were presented. 
8. One scandal has no bearing on additional scandals. While it seems logical that 
one such event might heighten media awareness, this did not appear to be the case. 
Coverage might also change due to the evolving nature of the media over time. While 
some years did have more coverage, this seemed to be driven by the scandals and 
their characteristics rather than changing roles of the media. In addition to the fixed 
effects for time, all models were re-estimated with state, fixed effects; the influence of 
the explanatory variables was remarkably similar to those reported, with only a few 
differences. 
9. These models were also estimated, including the total number of articles as an 
independent variable. Aside from capturing over 93 percent of the variance in word 
count, results varied little from the model presented above. 
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